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, and his description of the objects of his polemic accords with what are commonly regarded as general 1 . A phrase like xoùç rjôn eyvcoKoxaç {Enn. 2.9.15.22-23) may refer to persons who lay claim to special knowledge, i.e., gnostics. This is as close as Plotinus comes to using the label. 2.9.13.10, where Plotinus sets forth educated and harmonious gnosis (7iS7rai8euu£vr)ç... Kai êuueÀ.oûç yvcùaetoç) -i.e., traditional Greek gnosis -as a foil to gnostics' fear of the celestial spheres, may be an oblique reference to the gnostics' supposed gnosis. - In referring to what is evidently Enn. 2.9. Porphyry describes it as directed against those who say that the maker of the cosmos and the cosmos itself are evil {Vita Plot. 24 : Tipôç xoùç KOIKÔV XÔV ônuioupyôv xou KÔOUOU Kaï xôv KÔauov KCIKÔV etvou ^éyovxaç), that is, against persons with "gnostic" traits.
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gnostic characteristics. The treatise has received some attention 3 , but Plotinus' argument specifically with gnostic thaumaturgy has not been examined closely. Such an examination leads to consideration of some basic issues (and tensions) in Plotinus' thought ; it also illuminates his stance as a defender of Greek culture and is interesting from the standpoint of sociology of knowledge.
Plotinus' polemic takes its start from first-hand acquaintance with gnostics 4 and with gnostic writings 5 . He looks with scorn on what he labels the practice of magic (uayeuEiv) by gnostics -their use of chants, charms, enchantments, suasions, sounds, breathings, hissings 6 . He also ridicules the gnostics' claim that they free from disease by ridding the diseased, with a word (èÇaipeîv ^oycp), of the evil daemons which supposedly cause disease (Enn. 2.9.14.11-15). Such claims and practices Plotinus lumps with the feats performed by magicians which cause the masses to marvel 7 .
Plotinus' argument against what he reports as the gnostics' view of the cause and cure of disease recalls the polemic, in the Hippocratic corpus, against the common view of epilepsy as a "sacred disease." Like the Hippocratic author, Plotinus argues that disease has readily discernible causes and need not be attributed to evil daemons; the cures of diseases demonstrate the same thing {Enn. 2.9.14.17-23). By various reductiones ad absurdum Plotinus demonstrates that the theory of demonic causation of disease and the gnostic view of its cure are logically unnecessary (2.4.14.23-25). Plotinus contrasts such muddled and arrogant thinking with "our" philosophy, with its straightforwardness, clarity, stability, and discretion, and its pursuit of a reverent rather than an arrogant disposition (TO oeuvov, ou TO al'iOaôeç) (2.9.14. [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] . This philosophy is the standard by which to measure the views of others 8 , such as gnostic teachings, which are, throughout, diametrically opposed to it 9 . In his polemic Plotinus demonstrates how his philosophy is employed to take the measure of gnostic "magic". To show the absurdity and arrogance of gnostic chants and the like Plotinus asks how sounds can affect incorporeal beings 10 . And what presumption to address such chants to the higher powers with the intent of making them obey their (the gnostics') will (2.9.14.1-8) ! To do so is to diminish the majesty of those powers (2.9.14.9-11). As a foil to such practices Plotinus puts forward the self-control and well-ordered life-style advocated by philosophers and, as already noted, the superior nature and goals of his philosophy (2.9.14.12-13).
Even as Platonic philosophy is the context that informs Plotinus' attack on gnostic "magic", so Greek culture is the context of that philosophy, and, like Celsus, Plotinus is a self-conscious representative of both. This self-consciousness is seen in Plotinus' assertion that the gnostics' thaumaturgical practices, while appealing to the masses, do not deceive persons schooled in Greek culture, of which Greek philosophy is the capstone n . It is seen also when Plotinus, like Celsus before him 12 , assumes that that ancient culture and its authentic representatives, past and present, are superior to persons like the gnostics who, while clearly indebted to that culture, nonetheless ridicule and pervert it. Thus, while gnostics may correctly derive some of their teachings from Plato and other divine men of the past 13 , the things they have taken from the ancients (xoîç Tca^atoïç) have taken on some additions that are not fitting 14 . Such new teachings "have been found outside the truth 15 ." Plotinus summarizes some of these points where the gnostics stand in opposition (evaviioCaGat) to the ancients : "they introduce becomings and dissolutions of all kinds, find fault with the universe, censure the soul for its association with the body, criticize the one who directs the universe, identify the demiurge with Soul, and ascribe to the latter the same properties as those possessed by individual souls 16 ". Even when the gnostics 11. Enn. 2.9.14.15-18 (xoùç uévxoi ev> (ppovouvxoç OÙK av TtsfOoiev; the rest of the text is given in n. 7 above).
See Carl ANDRESEN, Logos und Nomos : Die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum (Arbeiten zur
Kirchengeschichte, 30; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1955). 13. The gnostic's general dependence on Plato and other "divine men" : Plato, Enn. 2.9.6.10-11 (6' À. CÙÇ yap xà uèv aûxoYç Ttapct xou rRdxoevoç eiÀ.r|7rxai) ; "divine men" (xoùç Oeiouç avôpaç, 2.9.6.36), designated as "those more ancient persons" (£KS{V(ÛV oeç TtaA-aioxepcov, 2.9.6.37), including Plato (2.9.6.42); cf. 2.9.6.5-7, the gnostics contrive neologisms to commend their own school (xrjç lôîaç aipeaecoç) to others as though they (the gnostics) had no connection with "the ancient Greek school" (xrjç âpxaïaç nviKrfç). Specifically the gnostics are dependent on Plato for their teachings on "ascents from the cave" (avafj&oeic IK XOÎ5 o7rr)A.aiou, 2.9.6.8-9); cf. Plato, Rep. 7.514Aff.), "the judgments and the rivers in Hades and transmigrations" (aï ÔIKCU KCXI oî 7roxauo\ oî iv Âiôou KCCI at liexevaiouaxcoaeiç, 2.9.6.13; cf. Plato, Phaed. lllDff.), "immortality of the soul, the noetic cosmos, the first deity, the necessity for the soul to escape association with the body, separation from the body, flight from becoming to being -these things are posited in Plato" (xaîJxa yàp Keîusva Ttapà xoe nXaxoevi, 2.9.6.39-42); the gnostics "have heard Plato many times blaming the body for the sorts of impediments it offers to the soul" (2.9.17.2-3); the plurality of noetic entitles (being, nous, demiurge, soul) in the gnostics' teaching derives from the Timaeus {Enn. 2.9.6.14-19; Plotinus cites from Tim. 39E 7-9). 14. Enn. 2.9.6.55-57 (xà 8' uoxepov xouxoiç nap' eiceîvcov À.r)(p9évxa, TtpoaGfJKaç hi xivaç ouôsv TrpoonKouaaç eiXncpota 20 . The gnostics' assertion that the association of the soul with the body is not to the soul's advantage originated, not with them (2.9.7.2-4), but with Plato (2.9.17.1-4). They misread him, however, in simply hating the body (ibid.) rather than accepting the necessity of remaining in the body, living in houses prepared by a good sister soul 21 and learning to take off this bodily nature in thought in order to behold the noetic sphere 22 . And rather than viewing the visible cosmos as wicked and the celestial bodies as hostile 23 , they should follow Plato (or Plotinus) in viewing this world as a beautiful image of the higher world 24 and the celestial bodies as beneficent deities 25 .
Plotinus' annoyance with the gnostics is in part the annoyance of the professional philosopher with dilettantes who fail to carry premises and assertions through to their logical conclusions. If the gnostics don't perceive where the rashness of their cosmic pessimism leads (oi)6 OTTOD TO Gpdooç aôioîj TOGTO xwpeï), Plotinus does, and 17. Enn. 2.9.4.2ff. : against the gnostic idea that the visible world resulted from the moral failure (acpaXeiaccv) of soul, Plotinus argues that a soul that declined (EVEUGE) would forget the things of the higher, noetic world (xco zm'kzkr\<3Qa\ br\kbvx\ xc5v EKET) ; "if it forgot, how could it function as a craftsman, for whence does it fashion except from the things it beheld in that world?" (el 8E 87T£^d9exo, Ttcûç ôrjuioupyeî; Ttô9ev yap TtotsT rj ft, aw EIÔEV EKET). The unspoken premise here is Plato's Timaeus where the demiurge fashions this world after the model of the living being (TO Çoeov ; Tim. 30C-D ; 39E). Similarly 2.9.6.24-25 (the gnostics give a false account of Plato's teaching on the way in which the world was fashioned). 18. Enn. 2.9.4.22ff. : persons who find many vexatious things (noXXa... 8uax£prj) in the visible world rate it too highly, thinking it should be the same as the noetic world rather than an image of it (et avouai TOV auTÔv eTvai TÛ) VO^TCD, àXXa uf\ eiKova EKEIVOU) -even so, what more beautiful image of that world (KaX?doL)V EIKOW EKEIVOU) could there be than this one? (Cf. Tim. 29D-30B.) 19. Enn. 2.9.4.1-2: the gnostics' assertion that the soul made the world after it had shed its wings errs in referring this passage (Plato, Phaedrus 246C) to the soul of the All (f^ TOU navtôç) (rather than to individual souls). They err, too, in saying their own soul and that of the worst persons is divine (Bstav) but yet denying to the celestial bodies a share in the immortal soul (uf| xn,ç cxGavàxou K£Koiva)vr)K£vai) (2.9.5.8-14). 20. Enn. 2.9.6.16-21 : the gnostics, not understanding (ou OUVEVTEÇ) Plato (Tim. 39E 7-9), interpret him as positing three nous's ; they think, moreover, that, according to Plato (Korea rRaxoova), the purposing nous (xôv 8È 8iavouu£Vov) is the demiurge, although they are far from knowing who the demiurge is and frequently identify soul with the demiurge.
21. Enn. 2.9.18.14-16 (8ei 8E UEVEIV UEV év OI'KOIÇ aoeua ê'xovxaç KaxaaKeuaaGcTaiv àno yu^nç aôeX(prjç àya6f)ç). 22. Enn. 2.9.17.4-5 (e^pf^v xauxn,v 7T£pieAÔvxaç xf\ ôiavoîa lôetv xô Xoi7xov, o(poiïpav vonjriv). 23. Enn. 2.9.15.21, nothing in this world is considered beautiful by gnostics (xouxcov yap ouôèv auxoTç Ka?i6v); 2.9.16.1-2, they despise the world and the gods and the other beautiful things in it (TO KdTCKppovfiaai KOOUOU Kai Geoev TWV EV aÙToe KOI TWV aXXwv Ka^wv); 2.9.6.59, they find fault with the universe (text in n. 16 above); the celestial regions do not produce evil persons here below (2.9.8.34-35) and the cosmic spheres (TOUÇ TOU KOOUOU acpaîpaiç) are not to be feared, despite their fiery bodies (2.9.13.9ff.). 24. Enn. 2.9.4.22ff. (see n. 18 above). 25. Plotinus praises the celestial spheres for their beauty and for their contribution to the functioning of the All (Enn. 2.9.13.14-20; cf. Plato, Tim. 38C-E, where the celestial bodies perform their appointed tasks of marking off time), for their souls (Enn. 2.9.13.12-13 ; cf. Tim. 38E and Laws 10.898D), and for the reference that the stars' symmetry, good order, and form (sîôoç) have to their sources (Enn. 
16
demonstrates the untenability of such pessimism (2.9.13. Iff.) as well as of their cosmogony (2.9.12.33ff.), their view of the cure of disease (2.9.14.24-35), their denial of providence (2.9.16.14ff.), and their despising of the celestial bodies (2.9.16.1-14). It is persons unskilled in argumentation and ignorant of educated gnosis, i.e., Greek philosophical tradition, who would be fearful of the fiery spheres in the sky 26 . Their ignorance is shown also by their talk of virtue without defining it or ever having written on the subject and without explaining how one attains virtue (2.9.15.27ff.). It is seen also in their clumsy behavior in setting forth their teachings : rather than demonstrating these in a friendly, philosophical, and even-handed way (euuevcoç Kal (piAoaoqxDÇ... ôiKaîcoç), they ridicule and insult those who differ with them (2.9.6.35ff.).
In part, however, Plotinus' polemic against the gnostics may represent an effort to purge himself of positions that were once close to his own or to suppress a continuing tension in his own thought, or both. The tension is generally acknowledged by scholars 27 . In the formulation of Dodds and Armstrong, it is the tension between the cosmology of the Timaeus (with its affirmation of the visible cosmos as an admirable product of soul) and the psychology of the Phaedo and the Phaedrus (with their view of the soul's descent into human form as unfortunate, the result of the soul's loss of its "wings") 28 . Scholars who have attended to the chronological order of Plotinus' treatises and/or to a genetic study of his thought 29 see his attack on the gnostic view that arrogance and audacity (tolma) motivate the soul in its task of making 30 as a disowning of a view which he himself once held 31 , which he found in Plato (Enn. 4.8.1), and which he had once tried to reconcile with the cosmogony of the Timaeus 32 . Plotinus moved, it seems, from ascribing the soul's descent to tolma, to rejection of that view and ascription of it to the gnostics, to a positive view of the descent 33 . "Whatever his earlier doubts, Plotinus emerges in the end as the upholder of Hellenic rationalism" 34 , affirming the goodness of the visible cosmos and the culture predicated on that traditional Greek affirmation 35 .
The gnostics' thaumaturgical claims and their view of the cause and cure of disease are only egregious aspects of what Plotinus sees as a threat to that culture. He defends it, as we have seen, against gnostic perversion and subversion. It is evident from the foregoing that such defense is a concern Plotinus shares with Celsus. And even as Celsus views Christians as an alien body in pagan society, so Plotinus finds in his gnostic opponents some of the same alienating traits adduced by Celsus in his polemic. The gnostics' pessimistic otherworldliness noted above and their absurd elitism and narcissism 36 set them apart from traditional pagan society, as do their disrespect for traditional deities 37 , their abdication of responsibility for persons outside their own circle 38 , and their disdain for "all laws in this world and for the virtue won long ago" 39 . Such disdain subverts the socialization processes that sustain culture and society 40 . It accords with this that gnostics nihilate the founders and foremost representatives of pagan culture (2.9.6.36, 44, 49-51) and that, far from being an elite group, as they imagine, embrace the worst sort of people 41 , to the detriment of society.
While Plotinus' polemic is sharp at times, it is not as shrill as that of Celsus. Plotinus' ultimate attitude to his opponents (though not to their teachings) is one of resignation. "What is one to say" (xi av TIÇ eutoi), asks Plotinus, in face of some of the gnostics' hopelessly muddled notions about the soul (2.9.5.22-23)? The gnostics need to be taught -"if they would bear with it in good spirit" (ei eùyvcouôvcoç otvexoivTo) -the nature of soul and of the demiurge (2.9.8.1-6). In an obvious reference to his opponents, he asks whether anyone -"unless he had gone daft" -would put up with the thought that human wisdom is superior to that of the celestial deities 42 . At one point Plotinus pauses to profess compunctions about continuing his detailed refutation of gnostic teachings : he has gnostic friends, and he has no hope of convincing them of their error in any case. They "chanced upon this teaching before they became our friends", and now "a certain regard for them possesses us" 43 . "I do not know how they persist in it [gnostic teaching]", he confesses 44 . Plotinus' treatise, then, is directed not to gnostics but against them, for the sake of his pupils : "The things we have said are addressed to our pupils, not to them [the gnostics] -for there is nothing more that might be done to persuade them -in order that they [the pupils] may not be disturbed by them [the gnostics], who do not provide proofs (for how could they?) but, rather, make audacious assertions..." 45 Plotinus' attitude to his gnostic opponents is, at least, an implicit recognition that what is in conflict between him and them is not simply discrete issues or practices -"magic", cosmogony and cosmology, anthropology -but whole ways of constructing reality, social and cultural "worlds" 46 . Thus, while Plotinus may have
